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Reentrant processing has been proposed as a critical mechanism in visual perception of an object’s fea-
tures. In order to test whether reentry is critical for visual awareness of object presence, the success of
reentry was manipulated with object substitution masking (OSM) while participants performed a
forced-choice target present–absent task and rated their subjective conﬁdence in each trial. Signal detec-
tion analyses were performed on the data from the forced-choice task and on the subjective conﬁdence
ratings. The results showed that OSM reduced sensitivity to the presence of the target, indicating that
reentry is critical for awareness of object presence. Consistent with the idea that OSM leaves feedforward
processing intact, conﬁdence ratings in reported target-absent trials were lower for misses (target pres-
ent, no response) than for correct rejections (target absent, no response), implying that a target-related
sensory signal was available for subjective ratings in spite of reported absence of the target. The results
suggest that reentry is critical for encoding the target representation into a stable, consciously reportable
form.
 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Recent theories of visual awareness agree that a mere feedfor-
ward ﬂow of information from the primary visual cortex (V1) to
higher visual areas is not sufﬁcient for full-blown, vivid conscious
perception. They concur that reentrant (recurrent or feedback) sig-
nals from higher areas back to the early visual cortex play an
important role in conscious vision (Bullier, 2001; Di Lollo, Enns,
& Rensink, 2000; Hochstein & Ahissar, 2002; Lamme & Roelfsema,
2000). At a more speciﬁc level, the roles of feedforward and reen-
trant processing in conscious visual perception are not clear.
According to the reversed hierarchy theory (RHT) (Hochstein &
Ahissar, 2002), conscious perception begins when feedforward
processing reaches high cortical levels, resulting in the ﬁrst
approximation ‘‘guess’’ (vision at a glance) as to the binding of fea-
tures falling within the large receptive ﬁelds of high cortical areas.
After vision at glance, conscious perception proceeds in a reentrant
manner to encompass detailed information available at the small
receptive ﬁelds of earlier cortical areas (vision with scrutiny). On
the other hand, Lamme (2006) has argued for a more tight connec-
tion between reentrant processing and visual awareness by pro-
posing that recurrent (reentrant) processes are necessary for
visual awareness, so that the presence of recurrent processing in
the brain can be considered as a neural marker of awareness.ll rights reserved.
ersity of Turku, 20014 Turku,Object substitution masking (OSM) (Di Lollo, Enns, & Rensink,
2000; Enns & Di Lollo, 1997) provides a psychophysical method
for studying the contribution of reentry on visual awareness as it
is generally assumed to interfere with visual processing at the stage
of reentry (for an alternative view, see Francis &Hermens, 2002; see
also the response from Di Lollo, Enns, & Rensink, 2002). OSM occurs
when a target and amask (e.g., four dots surrounding the target) ap-
pear simultaneously but themask persists after the offset of the tar-
get. The delayed offset of the mask impairs target identiﬁcation as
compared with a situation in which the target and mask offset
simultaneously. The object substitution theory (Di Lollo, Enns, &
Rensink, 2000) explains this effect by assuming that the representa-
tion of the target is substituted by that of themask during reentrant
processing. In the beginning of processing, the stimulus display is
encoded at a low level and feedforward activation proceeds to high-
er levels in which tentative representations are formed. These rep-
resentations may be incomplete or more than one representation
may be activated. The ambiguity can be resolved on the second
and later iterations by comparing the high level representations
with the initial pattern of activity at the lower level. A match is
found and processing continues if the stimulus display has not been
changed or if it has been turned off and there is nothing competing
with the decaying initial representation. However, if the reentrant
information does not match the information present at the lower
level, a new tentative representation emerges. Thus, in OSM, the
initial representation (target + mask) is replaced with that of the
trailingmaskwhich alone is present at the time of reentry. As a con-
sequence, the observer perceives only the mask. However, if atten-
44 M. Koivisto / Vision Research 63 (2012) 43–49tion is precued to the location where the target is going to appear,
the object substitution masking effect is greatly reduced because
fewer reentrant iterations are needed (Di Lollo, Enns, & Rensink,
2000; Enns, 2004; Enns & Di Lollo, 1997; Germeys et al., 2010). Re-
cent behavioral (Bouvier & Treisman, 2010; Koivisto & Silvanto,
2011) and neural (Boehler et al., 2008; Koivisto & Silvanto, 2012;
Kotsoni et al., 2007) studies have conﬁrmed that OSM takes place
at late stage of processing which most probably corresponds to
reentrant processing occurring after basic features have been ex-
tracted in feedforward manner. Thus, OSM provides a behavioral
method for manipulating reentrant processing.
Previous studies have shown that OSM reduces conscious iden-
tiﬁcation of the features of targets, such as the shape (Enns, 2004;
Woodman & Luck, 2003), color (Gellatly et al., 2007), orientation
(Boehler et al., 2008; Gellatly et al., 2007), semantic meaning (Reiss
& Hoffman, 2006), or conjunctions of features (Bouvier & Treisman,
2010; Koivisto & Silvanto, 2011). These results imply that reentrant
processes are involved in recognition of speciﬁc features of objects.
However, it is less clear whether the reentrant processes are criti-
cal for visual awareness of objects (i.e., of object presence). In two
recent studies on OSM (Chen & Treisman, 2009; Goodhew et al.,
2011), the participants performed a speeded discrimination task
regarding the mask and then a detection (present/absent) task con-
cerning the target in each trial. Both studies found that in those of
the target-present trials in which the participants reported that no
target was presented, the information suppressed via OSM never-
theless inﬂuenced performance in the mask discrimination tasks.
This pattern seems to suggest that conscious detection of target
presence speciﬁcally was inﬂuenced by OSM. However, these stud-
ies did not make any attempt to study whether the impairments in
detection reﬂected a genuine inability to discriminate between the
presence and absence of the target or whether the masking effects
were due to a conservative bias to report absence of the target
rather than its presence when unsure. It remains also unclear
whether the order of the tasks (the target detection tasks were per-
formed after the mask discrimination tasks) inﬂuenced the mask-
ing effects in the target detection task.
The implications of neuroscientiﬁc studies for the necessity of
reentry in visual awareness are unclear. For example, transcranial
magnetic stimulation (TMS) of early visual cortex (V1/V2) at late
latencies (which presumably correspond to the timing of reentrant
processing) has been shown to interfere with perception of motion
(Koivisto, Mäntylä, & Silvanto, 2010; Pascual-Leone &Walsh, 2001;
Silvanto, Lavie, & Walsh, 2005), binding of feature conjunctions
(Juan &Walsh, 2003; Koivisto & Silvanto, 2012), recognition of nat-
ural images (Camprodon et al., 2010; Koivisto et al., 2011) and ﬁg-
ure-ground segmentation (Heinen, Jolij, & Lamme, 2005), but it is
not clear whether TMS over early visual areas during reentrant
processing would prevent object representation from entering to
visual awareness. Thus, although the results of TMS studies are of-
ten considered as strong causal evidence for the necessity of reen-
trant processing in visual awareness, none of the TMS studies have
focused on the role of reentry in awareness of object’s presence.
The present study tested the role of reentry in visual awareness
by examiningwith the aid of signal detection analysis whether con-
scious detection of target’s presence is affected or not when reen-
trant processing is interfered by OSM. The participants gave a
forced-choice target present–absent response after each trial. This
resulted in four types of trials: hits (target present, yes response),
misses (target present, no response), correct rejections (target ab-
sent, no response), and false alarms (target absent, yes response).
By applying standard signal detection analysis (see e.g., Stanislaw
& Todorov, 1999) on the data, it was possible to analyze sensitivity
to the presence of the target independent of the decision criteria
(i.e., liberal or conservative bias) that the participants adopted for
reporting target presence. In addition to the ‘‘objective’’ forced-choice target present–absent task, the participants rated their sub-
jective conﬁdence after each trial. As unawareness of a stimulus
may result from different causes, the conﬁdence ratings were ex-
pected to shed light on the nature of the potential unawareness pro-
duced by OSM. If the stimulus signal is degraded to the extent that it
is indistinguishable from any signal at all, the unawareness repre-
sents perceptual blindness (Kanai, Walsh, & Tseng, 2010). Thus, sup-
pression of low-level signals leads to perceptual awareness and the
observer cannot subjectively distinguish between the presence and
absence of a stimulus. On the other hand, even a strong stimulus
may remain out of awareness because the observer is not attending
to it, for example, during inattentional blindness (Mack & Rock,
1998). In this case, the unawareness is attentional blindness inwhich
observers fail to notice the presence of a stimulus due to failure to
access low-level signals in spite of their presence (Kanai, Walsh, &
Tseng, 2010). In order to assess whether the potential unawareness
induced by OSM represents perceptual blindness or attentional
blindness, the second-level signal detection analysis compared
the subjective conﬁdence levels betweenmiss trials (target present,
no response) and correct rejections (target not present, no re-
sponse). Such analysis reveals whether or not the presence or ab-
sence of the target can be subjectively discriminated in spite of
the reported absence of the target in the forced-choice judgements
(Kanai, Walsh, & Tseng, 2010). Equal conﬁdence levels between
misses and correct rejections would indicate perceptual blindness
in which subjective invisibility is caused by suppression of low-le-
vel sensory signals; lower conﬁdence in misses than in correct
rejections would implicate attentional blindness in which observ-
ers fail to notice the presence of a target due to failure to access
low-level signals despite their presence (Kanai, Walsh, & Tseng,
2010). A backward pattern masking condition with a short target-
mask onset-asynchrony (SOA) was included to validate the proce-
dure and for comparing the results of OSM to a form ofmasking that
is expected to induce perceptual blindness by integration masking
(Turvey, 1973) during feedforward processing (Breitmeyer &
Ög˘men, 2006; Enns, 2004). In short, themain questionwaswhether
or not late stages of visual processing, as manipulated with OSM,
are critical for visual awareness of object presence.2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Sixteen graduate or undergraduate students (5 males, mean age
26.7 years, SD = 8.2) from the University of Turku volunteered.
They all had normal or corrected-to normal vision. The experiment
was carried out in accordance with The Code of Ethics of the World
Medical Association (Declaration of Helsinki).2.2. Stimuli and procedure
The stimuli were presented on a 1700 CRT-monitor with 75 Hz
screen refresh rate. Each stimulus display consisted of eight stim-
ulus dots (0.4  0.4 squares) in target present trials and seven
stimulus dots in target-absent trial (Fig. 1). The stimulus dots ap-
peared in eight possible positions and were arranged in a circular
pattern, centered 3.7 from ﬁxation. One of the positions was sur-
rounded by four additional dots, each centered 0.8 away from the
center of the position. In target-present trials, the position sur-
rounded by the four dots was occupied by a stimulus dot (i.e.,
the target); in the target-absent trials the position was empty.
Thus, the stimulus displays were constructed so that the target
(a dot) and the elements of the OSM mask (four dots) were
perceptually identical (Gellatly et al., 2007) and in simultaneous
presentation they could be perceived as a single object in a such
(A) Uncued stimulus-present trial in the object substitution condition 
(B) Cued stimulus-absent trial in the backward masking condition 
time
fixation fixation stimulus display mask
fixation cue stimulus display mask
500 ms
500 ms
100 ms
100 ms
27 ms
27 ms
300 ms
300 ms
Fig. 1. A schematic presentation of the stimuli and experimental procedure.
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representation needed updating at the object level (Moore & Lleras,
2005) (i.e., from ‘‘ﬁve’’ to ‘‘four’’). The backward mask was the #
symbol (0.7  0.7). The ﬁxation point, dots, and mask were white
and the background was black.
Each participant performed the object substitution condition
(OSM) and the backward masking condition in separate blocks,
with the order of the conditions counterbalanced across partici-
pants. Within both conditions, half of the trials were masked. Half
of the no mask and masked trials were cued.
Each uncued trial began with the ﬁxation point for 600 ms, fol-
lowed by the stimulus display for 27 ms. In the no mask trials, the
display was followed by a blank screen until the end of the trial. In
the masked OSM trials the four dots, which surrounded the target
position, remained on the screen for 300 ms after the offset of the
stimulus display (= trailing mask or delayed offset mask). In the
backward mask trials, the offset of the stimulus display was fol-
lowed by the backward mask in the target position for 300 ms.
The cued trials were otherwise identical to the uncued ones, but
the four dots appeared in the target position 100 ms earlier than
the stimulus display was turned on. There were an equal number
of target-present and target-absent trials in each condition.
After each trial, the participant made a forced-choice yes–no
discrimination response concerning whether or not a target was
presented in the position that was surrounded by the four dots.
After each forced-choice response, the participant rated the conﬁ-
dence of his/her response on a three-point scale (1 = low, 2 = inter-
mediate, 3 = high).
The order of no mask and mask trials, cued and uncued trials,
and the target location was randomized. For each participant, there
were a total of 512 trials, with 32 trials in each cell (e.g., 32 stim-
ulus-present, masked, cued trials in the OSM condition).2.3. Data analyses
Sensitivity to the presence of a target in the forced-choice task
was quantiﬁed as the area under the Receiver Operating Character-
istic curve (AUC), which was constructed by plotting hit rate (‘‘yes’’responses in target-present trials) against false alarm rate (‘‘yes’’
responses in target-absent trials). AUC is a nonparametric measure
that is unaffected by response bias, with the value .50 indicating an
inability to distinguish signals from noise and larger values indicat-
ing increasing ability to do so. Response bias was quantiﬁed as c.
Values of c higher than 0 indicate a conservative criterion and val-
ues lower than 0 indicate a liberal criterion. In the calculation of c,
hit and false alarm rates of 0 or 1 were dealt with adding 0.5 to
both the number of hits and the number of false alarms and adding
1 to both the number of stimulus-present trials and the number of
target-absent trials (Hautus, 1995).
A second-level AUC was computed for trials in which the partic-
ipants reported the absence of a target (misses and correct rejec-
tions) by plotting the rate of high-conﬁdence correct rejection
trials against high-conﬁdence miss trials (Kanai, Walsh, & Tseng,
2010). This AUC quantiﬁes the ability to discriminate between cor-
rect rejections and misses.3. Results
3.1. Sensitivity in the forced-choice target present–absent judgments
The effects of masking on sensitivity in the forced-choice target
present–absent task was studied by a Condition (2: OSM vs. back-
ward masking)  Cueing (2: uncued vs. cued) Masking (2: no
mask, mask) ANOVA on the ﬁrst-level AUC (Fig. 2). It revealed that
all the main effects (Fs(1,15)P 14.05, ps 6 0.002, g2p P .484), 2-
way interactions (Fs(1,15)P 14.99, ps 6 0.002, g2p P .500), and
the 3-way interaction (F(1,15) = 14.73, p = 0.002, g2p = .495) were
statistically signiﬁcant. Therefore the results for object substitution
and backward masking were analyzed separately.
In the OSM condition, a main effect for Masking (F(1,15) =
14.11, p = 0.002, g2p = .485) indicated that object substitution mask-
ing inﬂuenced the detection of the presence of the target. The main
effect for cueing was signiﬁcant (F(1,15) = 29.06, p < 0.001,
g2p = .660), showing that the cue enhanced detection performance.
In addition, stronger masking occurred in the uncued condition
than in the cued condition (Cueing Masking interaction:
Object   
substitution
Backward
masking
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
UnCued Cued UnCued Cued
A
U
C
No Mask Mask
*
*
*
-
Fig. 2. Sensitivity (area under the Receiver Operating Characteristic curve, AUC) to
the presence of target in uncued and cued trials as a function of masking. Asterisks
indicate statistically signiﬁcant differences between masked and unmasked trials
(p < 0.05). Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
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highly signiﬁcant without the cue (F(1,15) = 36.28, p < 0.001,
g2p = .708), no statistically signiﬁcant effect of masking was ob-
served in the cued condition (F < 1). Thus, OSM reduced sensitivity
to the presence of the target, but cueing completely eliminated its
effect.
In the backward masking condition, signiﬁcant masking oc-
curred (F(1,15) = 185.60, p < 0.001, g2p = .925). The main effect for
cueing (F(1,15) = 8.87, p = 0.009, g2p = .372) shows that the overall
level of performance was higher in the cued condition than in
the uncued one, but the masking effect did not vary as a function
of cueing (F < 1). The target present–absent discrimination perfor-
mance was not statistically signiﬁcantly different from the chance
level in the uncued backward masking condition (t(15) = 1.74,
p = 0.102), whereas in all other situations, including the OSM con-
ditions, the observers performed at higher than the chance level in
discriminating between target-present and target-absent trials
(tsP 3.97, ps 6 0.001).3.2. Response criterion (c)
For response criterion (c) (Fig. 3), a Condition Cueing Mask-
ing interaction (F(1,15) = 17.27, p = 0.001, g2p = .535) was observed.
Separate analysis of the OSM condition showed that the response
criterion was more conservative in masked than unmasked trials
(F(1,15) = 15.83, p = 0.001, g2p = .513), especially in the uncued con-
ditions (Cueing Masking: F(1,15) = 8.97, p = 0.009, g2p = .374).
One-group t-tests comparing the c scores to 0 in the OSM condition
showed a signiﬁcant liberal criterion bias in the uncued nomask tri--1
-0,8
-0,6
-0,4
-0,2
0
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Fig. 3. Response criterion (c) in uncued and cued trials as a function of masking.
Asterisks indicate statistically signiﬁcant biases (p < 0.05). Error bars represent
standard error of the mean.als (t(15) = 4.07, p = 0.001) and a conservative bias in the uncued
mask trials (t(15) = 2.23, p = 0.042). In other words, the observers
were reluctant to report the presence of the target when they were
unsure about it in uncued, masked OSM trials. In the backward
masking condition, cueing and masking interacted (F(1,15) =
10.55, p = 0.005, g2p = .413), indicating a liberal criterion bias in un-
cued masked condition (t(15) = 2.61, p = 0.020) and no bias in the
other conditions.3.3. Subjective conﬁdence in target-absent responses
In masked trials, four participants did not miss any targets in
the cued OSM condition, one did not make misses in the uncued
backward masking condition due to a liberal response criterion,
and one participant did not make any correct rejections in the un-
cued backward masking condition. Therefore the number of partic-
ipants varies in the following analyses.
Fig. 4 shows the frequency distribution of conﬁdence ratings
(scale: 1 = low, 2 = middle, 3 = high) for misses and correct rejec-
tions in the masked OSM and backward masking conditions.
Fig. 5 plots the mean conﬁdence ratings (on scale 1–3) of each indi-
vidual in correct rejection trials against those in miss trials. The
rates of high-conﬁdence misses and correct rejections were used
to compute the second-level AUC as a measure for the subjective
discriminability of misses and correct rejections. A 2 (Condi-
tion)  2 (Cueing) ANOVA on the second-level AUC revealed a main
effect for Condition, F(1,9) = 7.94, p = 0.020, g2p = .469, indicating
that the difference in conﬁdence between correct rejection and
miss trials was higher in OSM than in backward masking condition.
Cueing increased the discriminability (F(1,9) = 6.58, p = 0.030,
g2p = .422) differently depending on the masking condition (Condi-
tion  Cueing (F(1,9) = 6.05, p = 0.036, g2p = .402).
In the OSM condition cueing increased discriminability of
misses and CRs (F(1,11) = 5.96, p = 0.033, g2p = .351). The value of
AUC was higher than expected by chance both in uncued
(.53)(t(15) = 3.15, p = 0.007) and cued (.65) (t(11) = 2.95, p = .013)
conditions, showing that the observers were subjectively able to
discriminate between target-absent (correct rejection) and tar-
gets-present (miss) trials, irrespective of cueing.
In backward masking, the value of AUC did not differ from
chance level in the uncued condition (.50) (t(13) = 1.20, p = 0.254),
suggesting that the observers could not subjectively discriminate
between target-present (miss) and target-absent (correct rejection)
trials. In the cued condition, the value of AUC was higher than ex-
pected by chance (.51) (t(15) = 2.58, p = 0.021), but the difference
between uncued and cued condition did not reach statistical signif-
icance (F(1,13) = 2.81, p = 0.117, g2p = .178).4. Discussion
The role of reentrant or recurrent processing in conscious per-
ception was studied by making use of substitution masking
(OSM) which is assumed to occur speciﬁcally at the stage of reen-
try. It is well known that OSM impairs perception and binding of
visual features (Boehler et al., 2008; Bouvier & Treisman, 2010;
Enns, 2004; Gellatly et al., 2007; Koivisto & Silvanto, 2011; Reiss
& Hoffman, 2006; Woodman & Luck, 2003). The major question
here was whether or not OSM is able to wholly mask the presence
of a target stimulus. The results from signal detection analysis re-
vealed that OSM strongly reduced sensitivity to the presence of the
target. This occurred when attention was not cued to the position
of the target. When the target location was precued, the object sub-
stitution masking effect was completely eliminated, replicating
earlier ﬁndings (Di Lollo, Enns, & Rensink, 2000; Enns, 2004; Enns
& Di Lollo, 1997).
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Fig. 4. The probability of low, middle, and high conﬁdence ratings in those masked trials in which absence of the target was reported (misses, correct rejections) as a function
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M. Koivisto / Vision Research 63 (2012) 43–49 47Given that OSM reduced awareness of targets, it was reasonable
to analyze the subjective conﬁdence ratings when the target was
missed. The conﬁdence ratings for miss trials were lower than
those for correct rejections, suggesting that when the participants
were not aware of the target, they were nevertheless able to sub-
jectively discriminate between target-present and target-absent
trials. Thus, the invisibility produced by OSM was attentional blind-
ness (Kanai, Walsh, & Tseng, 2010) in which the target-related sen-sory signal was present but the observers failed to access it. This is
consistent with the idea that OSM leaves feedforward processing
intact (Di Lollo, Enns, & Rensink, 2000). By contrast, backward
masking produced a different pattern of results, consistent with
the expectation that it inﬂuences earlier stages of processing than
OSM (Breitmeyer & Ög˘men, 2006; Enns, 2004). Without precueing,
backward masking completely eliminated the sensitivity to the
presence of a target. In addition, subjective conﬁdence ratings for
48 M. Koivisto / Vision Research 63 (2012) 43–49misses and correct rejections were equal, indicating that the pres-
ence of targets was subjectively indistinguishable from their phys-
ical absence. These ﬁndings imply the invisibility induced by
backward masking was perceptual blindness (Kanai, Walsh, & Tseng,
2010) in which the sensory signal was reduced and was not avail-
able even for conﬁdence ratings.
In general, backward masking by pattern produced stronger
masking effects than masking by object substitution. No attempt
was made to match the sensitivity (AUC) in the forced-choice task
between OSM and backward masking. By increasing the SOA be-
tween the target and mask in the backward masking condition,
sensitivity might have increased to the same level as in the OSM
condition but the mechanism of backward masking would have
changed from integration at feedforward stage to interruption
(Turvey, 1973) which is supposed to occur at the stage of reentrant
processing (Breitmeyer & Ög˘men, 2006; Enns, 2004). In the present
study, the important conclusion from the comparison between the
masking types is, however, that the masking-induced unawareness
is qualitatively different depending on whether feedforward or
reentrant processing is inﬂuenced.
What is the conscious status of the signal that survived the
attentional blindness induced by OSM? The account that reentrant
processing is necessary for awareness (Lamme, 2006) would argue
that the signal was unconscious. Recent studies have revealed that
information suppressed via OSM can have an indirect inﬂuence on
behavior, suggesting that an unconscious signal survives the mask-
ing by substitution (Chen & Treisman, 2009; Goodhew et al., 2011).
It is not clear, however, how unconscious information could be
incorporated into the subjective conﬁdence ratings in the present
study. One option would be that the unconscious signal triggered
a shift of attention to the location of the target (Woodman & Luck,
2003), which might enable the observers to distinguish the target-
present trials from target-absent trials in conﬁdence ratings.
Because the four dots would anyway shift attention to the target
location irrespective of the presence or absence of the target, it re-
mains unclear how the target-induced shift of attention could be
subjectively discriminated from the shift triggered by the four dots
alone.
An alternative account for the attentional blindness during OSM
would suppose that feedforward activity is sufﬁcient for visual
awareness of target presence. Backward masking at a short SOA
disrupts the signal at a feedforward stage with the consequence
that there is no signal to reach visual awareness. OSM leaves the
feedforward signal intact and does not block a target representa-
tion’s presence in awareness: it substitutes the conscious represen-
tation of the target in awareness with that of the mask during
reentrant processing. At a phenomenological level, the area sur-
rounded by the four dots indeed looks empty for most of the time
during delayed mask offset (because it is empty) and the observers
base their target-absent decisions on this impression, not on the
ﬂeeting representation of the target which they fail to encode in vi-
sual short-term memory. A recent electrophysiological study
(Prime et al., 2011) is in line with this view in suggesting that
OSM inﬂuences performance at a relatively late stage of encoding
the target in visual short-term memory. This view is also consis-
tent with the ﬁnding that the observers used a conservative deci-
sion criterion during a delayed mask offset in the OSM condition.
In other words, observers tended to report that no target was pre-
sented when they were uncertain about its presence. The lower
conﬁdence in miss trials than in correct rejection trials reveals that
the observers were at some elementary level subjectively aware of
the target even when absence of the target was reported in the bin-
ary forced-choice present–absent decisions.
Is it necessary to make the assumption of reentry for explaining
the object substitution masking results? The critics of the reentrant
theory of Di Lollo, Enns, and Rensink (2000) have suggested thatfeedforward models of backward masking can account for object
substitution masking results, without the assumption of reentry.
Francis and Hermens (2002) performed computer simulations
which suggested that feedforward theories can account for the
data of Di Lollo, Enns, and Rensink (2000). However, Di Lollo, Enns,
and Rensink (2002) responded to this criticism by pointing out that
the modeling of attention in terms of mask intensity was not plau-
sible and that some of the feedforward models in fact included
reentrant components. In addition, only a subset of the results of
Di Lollo, Enns, and Rensink (2002) was included in the simulations,
ignoring important aspects of the data. Later simulations (Di Lollo
et al., 2004; Francis & Cho, 2007) have found best ﬁt to the results
with models that incorporate reentrant processes. Even if we ac-
cept the importance of reentrant processing in visual processes,
we are left with the problem of how good procedure the OSM is
for discriminating between feedforward and reentrant processes.
At neural level, extrastriate areas receive the feedforward signals
from V1 within few milliseconds and start immediately to send
reentrant signals back to V1 (Bullier, 2001; Lamme & Roelfsema,
2000). It is not clear to what extent OSM is able to interfere with
such early ‘‘local recurrent processing’’ or whether it interferes pri-
marily with the later large-scale recurrent interactions involving
parietal and frontal networks.
In sum, signal detection analysis of the forced-choice results
showed that that OSM decreased sensitivity to the presence of
the target. However, signal detection analysis of subjective conﬁ-
dence in the OSM trials in which no target was reported (misses,
correct rejections) showed that the participants were able to sub-
jectively discriminate between target-present and target-absent
trials. It is plausible to assume that the object representation
reached phenomenal awareness in OSM condition, but it was
substituted rapidly during reentry by that of the mask. This inter-
pretation is consistent with the concepts of vision-at-glance in RHT
(Hochstein & Ahissar, 2002) and gist in scene perception (Li et al.,
2002). Both concepts involve the idea that elementary conscious
perception can be reached in purely feedforward manner. In this
view, reentry serves as a modulatory mechanism (Macknik &
Martinez-Conde, 2007) which shapes the clarity and vividness of
conscious perception and makes it accessible for conscious report.
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